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CAsE CoMMENT
Rights, the Homeless, and Social Change:  
Ref lections on Victoria (City) v. Adams (bcsc)
 
Mar got Young 1
Canadian courts are notorious for excluding basic social and economic rights2 from protection under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.3 Our governments are complicit in this, 
consistently urging on the courts, in the words of the United Nations 
Committee monitoring the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, “an interpretation of the Charter which would deny 
any protection of Covenant [social and economic] rights and consequently 
leave the complainants without the basic necessities of life and without 
any legal remedy.”4 
 A recent judgment out of the British Columbia Supreme Court, 
Victoria (City) v. Adams,5 challenges this pattern of failure. In this case, 
several homeless individuals successfully convinced the court that the 
City of Victoria infringed their section 7 rights under the Charter when 
 1 Associate professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia. The author thanks Doug 
Harris for skilful editing and acknowledges the support of sshrcc cura project funding.
 2 Social and economic rights include, for example, rights to health, social assistance, housing, 
and so on. For a more expansive list of what is protected in international human rights law, 
see the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (xxi), 
21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into 
force 3 January 1976. 
 3 Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 
11 [Charter]. As Martha Jackman notes, a 2008 report from the International Commission of 
Jurists (icj) documents that Canadian courts and tribunals are distinctive in their continuing 
reluctance to recognize and enforce the socio-economic rights set out in the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, an international treaty to which Canada 
has been signatory since 1976. See International Commission of Jurists, Courts and the Legal 
Enforcement of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Comparative Experiences of Justiciability 
(Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 2008), cited in Martha Jackman, “Charter 
Remedies for Socio-Economic Rights Violations: Sleeping under a Box?” in Taking Remedies 
Seriously, ed. Kent Roach (Montreal: Les Éditions Yvon Blais, forthcoming), 2.
 4 Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, canada, 
E/C.12/1/Add.31, 1 December 1998, para. 14.
 5 2008 bcsc 1363, [2008] B.C.W.L.D. 7817 [Adams].
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the city prohibited homeless individuals from putting up temporary 
shelter when sleeping outside in public space.6
 More specifically, the case involves a constitutional challenge under 
section 7 of the Charter to two City of Victoria bylaws: the Parks Regu-
lation Bylaw No. 07-0597 and the Streets and Traffic Bylaw No. 92-84.8 
These bylaws, at the time of the trial, prohibited taking up temporary 
abode in a public space.9 In practice, this meant a ban on erecting any 
form of overhead protection while sleeping outside on public property, 
even on a temporary basis, at all times.10 Thus, putting up tents, tarps, 
or even sheltering under cardboard boxes for only a few hours on public 
property while sleeping was forbidden.
 The case arose in October 2005, when the City of Victoria commenced 
an action to obtain a civil injunction to enforce these two bylaws in 
relation to a tent city consisting of seventy people and twenty tents in 
Victoria’s Cridge Park. The defendants – nine of the homeless people 
living in the tent city – opposed the application, raising the Charter in 
defence. After significant procedural and interim wrangling (including 
the city’s attempt to have the action discontinued), the case came to trial 
in June 2008. Two parties intervened at the British Columbia Supreme 
Court level: the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association and the 
attorney general of British Columbia.
 Justice Carol Ross of the British Columbia Supreme Court held that 
the bylaws and their enforcement negatively affected the life, liberty, 
and security of the person interests protected under section 7 of the 
Charter. Further, such infringement, because it was both arbitrary and 
overbroad, was inconsistent with the principles of fundamental justice. 
The result, Justice Ross held, was a “significant” infringement of section 7 
that was not justified under section 1 of the Charter. The court issued a 
declaration that the bylaws were of no force and effect insofar as they 
apply to prevent homeless people from erecting temporary shelter.
 The City of Victoria and the BC attorney general had argued that the 
bylaws were essential to maintaining the public benefits of urban parks. 
 6 Section 7 states: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the 
right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice.”
 7 City of Victoria, Bylaw No. 07-059, ss. 13(1), (2), 14(1), (2), 16(1) [Parks Regulation Bylaw].
 8 City of Victoria, Bylaw No. 92-84, ss. 73(1), 74(1) [Streets and Traffic Bylaw].
 9 In August 2007, the Parks Regulation Bylaw was amended by the city so that it “no longer 
prohibited ‘loitering’ in public parks” (Adams, para. 24). Prior to the hearing, at the defendants’ 
request, the city clarified that the “operational policy of the Victoria Police” for enforcement 
of the bylaws allowed for sleeping in public in some circumstances but did not allow the use 
of any tents, tarps, boxes or other structures (Adams, para. 26).
 10 Adams, para. 4.
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Indeed, Justice Ross began her judgment by recognizing that this case 
raises “an inevitable conflict between the need of homeless individuals to 
perform essential, life-sustaining acts in public and the responsibility of 
the government to maintain orderly, aesthetically pleasing public parks 
and streets.”11 But Justice Ross concluded that, by targeting behaviour 
not necessarily linked to damage to public parks, the bylaws overstep 
their purpose and consequently run afoul of the Constitution.
 The City of Victoria has appealed this decision, and argument was 
heard before the British Columbia Court of Appeal on 10 and 11 June 
2009. Five intervenors joined the fray at this level: the provincial attorney 
general and the Union of BC Municipalities argued for the constitu-
tionality of the bylaws, while the British Columbia Civil Liberties 
Association, the Pivot Legal Society, and the Poverty and Human 
Rights Centre argued that the bylaws contravened the Charter. At the 
time of writing, the Court of Appeal has yet to issue its decision. 
 This case is significant for its approach to several key doctrinal and 
theoretical issues that, for some time, have haunted rights litigation 
regarding socio-economic issues under the Charter. This comment 
focuses on three aspects of the decision: first, the centrality of the 
debate over negative and positive rights to the case; second, the court’s 
configuration of the underlying sociological issue of homelessness; and, 
third, the implications of the case for the larger debate on the Charter’s 
potential for effecting transformative change.
The Contest over  
Negative and Positive Rights
Classically, a distinction has been drawn between civil and political 
rights and socio-economic rights.12 Civil and political rights, or “first-
generation rights,” protect such things as rights to association, expression, 
voting, and religion, and they are often understood as those rights most 
meaningful to those already in possession of property and privilege in 
our political, economic, and social systems. Social and economic rights, 
or “second-generation rights,” recognize more material needs and, at 
their strongest, demand redistribution of resources to the less fortunate 
and less privileged.
 Social and economic rights are claimed to suffer from justiciability 
issues: typically, these are concerns about judicial competency and in-
 11 Senior District Judge Atkins in Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992), 
1554, quoted in Adams, para. 1.
 12 Jeremy Waldron, ed., Theories of Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).
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stitutional legitimacy.13 Notedly, as a feature of this debate, social and 
economic rights are condemned as positive rights, while civil and po-
litical rights are more favourably understood as negative rights. Negative 
rights, on the one hand, are those entitlements that dictate government 
non-interference only; positive rights, on the other hand, require positive 
government provision – government proaction, not simply government 
forbearance.14 Thus, positive rights are seen to involve allocation of state 
resources. It is argued that civil and political rights, as negative rights, 
better fit the arena of judicially protected constitutional rights, while 
social and economic rights involve social policy, a matter best left to the 
judgment of government and politicians.15
 This divide between these generations of rights has long been dis-
credited by international and domestic human rights experts, for whom 
the interdependence and indivisibility of all human rights is common 
creed.16 Every human right imposes a mix of both negative and positive 
state obligations: civil and political rights no less than social and 
economic rights. Even traditional “negative” rights must be supervised 
and supported by the state using public resources.17 Thus, any tidy scheme 
whereby judicially protected rights are limited to negative obligations is 
logically and historically flawed.
 Some judges, in some contexts, understand this.18 But the contrast 
between negative and positive rights, “long abandoned under interna-
 13 See, for example, the discussion in David Wiseman, “Taking Competence Seriously,” in 
Poverty: Rights, Social Citizenship and Legal Activism, ed. Margot Young, Susan B. Boyd, 
Gwen Brodsky and Shelagh Day, 263-80 (Vancouver: ubc Press, 2007); Stephen Holmes and 
Cass Sunstein, The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes (New York: W.W. Norton, 
1999); Jill Cottrell and Yash Ghai, “The Role of Courts in the Protection of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights,” in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Practice: The Role of 
Judges in Implementing Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ed. Yash Ghai and Jill Cottrell, 
58-90 (London: Interights, 2004); Margot Young, “Section 7 and the Politics of Social Justice” 
(2005) 38 ubc L. Rev. 539-60.
 14 The provision of services or benefits that are preconditions to the fulfillment of certain 
interests protected as rights are examples of the kind of proactive government observance of 
rights that the debate imagines.
 15 In Adams, the city and the attorney general argued that the complex issue of homelessness 
was an area of policy most appropriate to the legislature, not the courts.
 16 Jackman, “Sleeping under a Box?”; Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.157/23 (12 July 1993); Montreal Principles on Women’s Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (December 2002), online: International Federation for Human Rights <http://www.
fidh.org/IMG/pdf/ca0110a.pdf>.
 17 Holmes and Sunstein, “Cost of Rights,” 51–52.
 18 In Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2002 scc 84, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 [Gosselin] Justice 
Bastarache argues in his dissenting judgment that: “The appellant and several of the inter-
venors made forceful arguments regarding the distinction that is sometimes drawn between 
negative and positive rights, as well as that which is made between economic and civil rights, 
arguing that security of the person often requires the positive involvement of government 
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tional human rights law and increasingly rejected in other constitutional 
democracies,”19 lives on in Canadian constitutional discourse and, in 
particular, plagued argument in this case. The City of Victoria and the 
BC attorney general argued strongly that the rights protected under 
section 7 of the Charter are negative rights only. Consequently, without 
the target of government action of some sort, the claimants have 
no section 7 issue. Government inaction or insufficient action will not 
trigger section 7. The strategy in this case, attempted unsuccessfully by 
the city and the attorney general at the Supreme Court level, was to 
turn the complaint about the bylaws into a claim for more substantive 
resolution of the underlying homelessness issue and then to disqualify 
that claim on the basis that it was for a positive right – something, they 
argued, section 7 did not protect.
 The BC Supreme Court effectively sidestepped direct debate over 
positive versus negative rights by holding simply that the claim involved 
an issue of state interference only.20 While this avoidance of the issue 
eased the way for the immediate favourable result for the claimant, it also 
raised two larger problems, as Martha Jackman thoughtfully points out. 
First, Justice Ross’s ruling fails to debunk the notion of a constitutionally 
meaningful distinction between negative and positive rights.21 Indeed, 
her reasoning reinforces the claimed contrast.22 Second, narrowing the 
claim to a mere negative right means that the solution or remedy to the 
infringement is simply government forbearance – elimination of the 
prohibitive bylaws. Yet, as any advocate for the homeless will attest, 
resolution of homelessness requires significant government action – re-
sources and proactive policy and planning. What role can constitutional 
rights so calibrated play in this struggle? I return to this larger point at 
the conclusion of this comment.
 It is open for the Court of Appeal to reject the traditional dichotomy 
of positive and negative rights. It is also possible for this court to establish 
that section 7 obligates government to take a variety of both negative 
in order for it to be realized. This is true. The right to be tried within a reasonable time, for 
instance, may require governments to spend more money in order to establish efficient judicial 
institutions” (Gosselin, para. 218).
 19 Jackman, “Sleeping under a Box?” 1.
 20 Adams, para. 78.
 21 Jackman, “Sleeping under a Box?” 13. While trial court judges are seldom as “adventurous” 
in their judgments as legal commentators might wish, it was still open for her to cast more 
doubt on the utility of these notions. 
 22 Justice Ross wrote: “In my view, the Defendants do not seek positive benefits in this action 
and it is therefore not necessary for the Court to consider whether s. 7 includes a positive 
right to the provision of shelter.” See Adams, para. 119.
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and positive actions.23 Certainly, the justices had considerable argument 
before them to that effect. The Poverty and Human Rights Centre, as 
intervenor at the Court of Appeal level, focused significantly on what 
its written argument regarded as a “neither necessary nor helpful” 
categorization,24 arguing that “all rights are positive to varying degrees 
because all rights, one way or another, depend on positive action by 
governments for their enforcement.”25 The Court of Appeal would do 
well to reject the government’s continued assertion of a distinction that 
is long past its stale date. As Louise Arbour, speaking as United Nations 
High Commissioner of Human Rights, stated: “There is nothing to fear 
from the idea of socio-economic rights as real, enforceable, human rights 
on equal footing with all other human rights, and no cause for simplistic 
or categorical distinctions between these rights, and rights described as 
‘civil and political.’”26 
Understanding Homelessness
Understanding poverty and its manifestations is a considerable challenge 
for judges, given their own social and economic position.27 As Dianne 
Pothier has written about other constitutional rights: “the ultimate 
question is whether the court ‘gets’ the context of the claimant in order to 
be able to make a sensible judgment.”28 The stories and experiences of the 
marginalized do not easily make their way into law and legal judgment.29 
Indeed, the challenge is to persuade courts to understand “the day-to-
 23 Chief Justice McLachlin in the Gosselin decision stated: “One day s. 7 may be interpreted to 
include positive obligations.” See Gosselin, para. 82.
 24 Adams (Factum of the Intervenor, Poverty and Human Rights Centre, para. 43).
 25 Ibid., para. 49. Acceptance of such an argument would mean that section 7 itself could be 
understood as embracing rights that required positive government action. 
 26 Louise Arbour, “Freedom from Want: From Charity to Entitlement” (LaFontaine-Baldwin 
Lecture, delivered at the Capitole de Québec, 4 March 2005). Available online at http://www.
icc-icc.ca/en/assets/pdf/lectures/LouiseArbour_Lecture.pdf (viewed 18 October 2009).
 27 See, for example, Martha Jackman, “Open Justice or ‘Just Us’: The Poor, the Courts and the 
Charter,” in Open Justice/La transparence dans le système judiciaire, ed. Yves-Marie Morissette, 
Wade MacLauchlan, and Monique Ouellette, 281-94 (Montreal: Les Éditions Themis/ 
Canadian Institute for the Advancement of Justice, 1994); Martha Jackman, “Reality Checks: 
Presuming Innocence and Proving Guilt in Charter Welfare Cases,” in Poverty: Rights, 
Social Citizenship, and Legal Activism, ed. Margot Young et al., (Vancouver: ubc Press, 2007) 
23-39; Diane Pothier, “But It’s for Your Own Good,” in Poverty: Rights, Social Citizenship, 
and Legal Activism, ed. Margot Young et al., (Vancouver: ubc Press, 2007) 40-56. Also, more 
generally, see Jennifer Nedelsky, “Embodied Diversity and the Challenges to Law” 42 (1997) 
McGill L. J. 91-117. 
 28 Pothier, “For Your Own Good,” 42.
 29 Nor do they resonate strongly in elite politics, which is why, of course, these claims end up 
as constitutional challenges.
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day realities of living in poverty and to [appreciate] the enormous social 
constraints that structure the ‘options’ that are meaningfully available.”30 
One example of failure to rise to this challenge is Chief Justice Beverly 
McLachlin’s Supreme Court of Canada majority judgment in Gosselin 
v. Quebec (Attorney General).31 In this case, ignoring the vulnerability 
and precariousness of those on social assistance, the chief justice found 
that an age-based scheme that resulted in a monthly welfare benefit of 
$170 – roughly one-third of regular benefit levels – was no affront to 
human dignity and freedom.
 Justice Ross’s decision in Adams rests on firmer and more credible 
sociological foundations. Specifically, three general factual findings were 
critical to the court’s decision and, together, show sound judicial appre-
ciation of the experiences and contexts of the claimants. First, the court 
accepted that hundreds of those homeless in Victoria “have no option but 
to sleep outside in the public spaces of the City,” given the large disparity 
between the number of homeless people and the availability of shelter 
beds.32 Moreover, for certain groups, shelter spaces are not available or 
not appropriate. Shelters in Victoria do not accept children, few spaces 
are available for youth, and couples cannot gain access to shelter services 
together. 
 Second, the court found that both individual and social factors account 
for homelessness.33 It cited a long and full list of the social factors to 
blame for this: deinstitutionalization, federal government withdrawal 
from social-sector housing, rising housing costs and shrinking earning 
power, policy changes to federal transfer payments, and changes to British 
Columbia’s income assistance policy. The list makes clear that the court 
understood the systemic nature of the causes of homelessness.
 These two sets of findings are critical. I have argued elsewhere that 
overly simplistic classical (or neoliberal) ideals of individual choice con-
 30 Janet E. Mosher, “Welfare Reform and the Re-Making of the Model Citizen,” in Poverty: 
Rights, Social Citizenship, and Legal Activism, ed. Margot Young et al. (Vancouver: 
ubc Press, 2007), 134.
 31 Gosselin, para. 1.
 32 Adams, paras. 5, 58, 69. The court accepted a 2007 Task Force report that concluded that 
planning to address the problem should assume that fifteen hundred individuals in Victoria 
were homeless. Another report concludes that, at best, available shelter beds can serve only 
326 individuals. Consequently, the court wrote: “It is abundantly clear from the evidence … 
that there are currently many more homeless people in Victoria than can be accommodated 
in the available shelters. While some homeless people choose to seek accommodation in the 
shelters, the fact is that there are not sufficient spaces in the shelters to accommodate those 
who seek shelter. Thus hundreds of people are left to sleep in the public places in the City” 
(Adams, para. 58). 
 33 Ibid, para. 59.
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figure too much of Charter equality jurisprudence.34 Similarly, the idea 
that the state bears no constitutional obligation for situations that result 
from individual choice – no matter how distressing the outcome – under 
section 7 of the Charter is also popular among governments and courts. 
Here, in order to argue that the city had no constitutional obligations with 
respect to the homeless claimants, both the attorney general of British 
Columbia and the city filed evidence that individuals were sleeping in 
public parks by choice. 
 However, Justice Ross, because of these two findings, held that it is 
only a minority of individuals who choose to be homeless: “While there 
may be some people for whom urban camping is a lifestyle choice, it is 
clear that this is not the situation of the majority of the population of 
Victoria’s homeless. Rather, there are people who do not have practicable 
alternatives.”35 Concluding that the homeless are on the streets over time 
because of larger social factors and, on any one particular night, because 
of inadequate shelter beds refutes the argument that “sleeping rough” is 
best understood merely in terms of individual idiosyncrasy and choice.
 Third, the court accepted expert evidence that, absent some form of 
overhead protection, homeless people incur significant risks to health, 
including death by hypothermia.36 For example, the court found, based 
on one expert’s testimony, that, “if homeless people who sleep outside 
are prohibited from erecting even the most rudimentary forms of shelter 
from the elements (e.g., tent, tarpaulin, or cardboard barriers), this would 
have clear and direct adverse impacts on their health.”37 In combination 
with other similar testimony, the court concluded that the prohibition 
against making a temporary abode while sleeping outdoors on public 
property is an interference with the life, liberty, and security of the person 
of the homeless claimants.
 These conclusions allowed the court a more nuanced contextual 
appreciation of the perspectives and experiences of the claimants. It is 
their “common sense” that emerges and underpins the decision.
 34 Margot Young, “Blissed Out: Section 15 at Twenty,” in Diminishing Returns: Inequality 
and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ed. Sheila McIntyre and Sanda Rodgers, 
(Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2006), 45.
 35 Adams., para. 66.
 36 Ibid., para. 142.
 37 Ibid., para. 67, quoting from the expert opinion of Dr. Stephen Hwang of the Department 
of Medicine, University of Toronto.
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Whither Charter Rights?
Legal judgments typically allow endless hours of close doctrinal and 
ideological analysis (at least for those so inclined). But their results, inde-
pendent of these details, also matter tremendously, although not always 
predictably or straightforwardly.38 In this case, the court reached the right 
conclusion, at least on the issue as it was framed by the claimants and 
the court. Prohibiting shelter for those forced to sleep outdoors, absent 
sound and convincing state reasons pertaining to the larger public good, 
must be unconstitutional if our system of constitutional rights is to have 
any claim to ensuring a just society. The judgment is clear that there are 
constitutional limits on governments’ powers to restrict an individual’s 
ability to provide shelter for herself or himself.39 This is good.
 However, my concluding argument is, I hope, more subtle than this. 
What does it mean for one of the few victories under the Charter for 
social and economic rights – assuming this Supreme Court judgment 
holds up on appeal – to grant so minimal a protection to so needy and 
marginalized a sector of Canadian society? More concretely, the result 
of this victory is, as the city understands it, to require the city merely 
to suspend the prohibition on shelter from 7:00 pm to 7:00 am the next 
morning.40 The case established no other obligations to the homeless. Is 
this, then, a case that offers much to celebrate in terms of the progressive 
force our Charter holds for Canadian society? Certainly, this case does 
not involve a minor or insignificant issue. While the manifestations of 
poverty in Canada are many, homelessness is among the most extreme 
and distressing.41 The issue of homelessness and appropriate state re-
sponses to it is clearly critical, engaging a number of Charter rights.
 The claimants’ lawyers, however, appear to have strategically chosen 
a narrow conceptualization of their clients’ rights: the city is obligated 
 38 See, for example, Stuart Scheingold, The Politics of Rights: Lawyers, Public Policy and Political 
Change, 2nd ed. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004).
 39 Victoria (City) v. Adams: Advancing the Rights to Shelter, Law Sheet, the Poverty and Human 
Rights Centre, 2009, 2. Available online at http://povertyandhumanrights.org (viewed 6 
October 2009).
 40 Parks Regulation Bylaw, Amendment Bylaw (No. 5), No. 09-074, A Bylaw of the City of Victoria. 
Available online at http://www.victoria.ca/cityhall/bylaws_list.shtml  (viewed 21 December 
2009). Indeed, the City of Victoria has started confiscating any shelter materials that are left 
up outside of these hours, arresting individuals with tents still standing after 7:00 am. See 
Andrew MacLeod, “Tent Camping Homeless to Politicians: Face Facts!” Tyee, 16 June 2009. 
Available online at http://thetyee.ca/News/2009/06/16/VictoriaTentCamping/index.html 
(viewed 11 October 2009).
 41 Federation of Canadian Municipalities, Quality of Life in Canadian Communities: Trends and 
Issues in Affordable Housing and Homelessness, Theme Report no. 4 (2008). Available online at 
http://www.fcm.ca/CMFiles/qol20081VVM-3272008-3162.pdf (viewed October 2009).
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simply to allow the homeless to erect temporary shelter without gov-
ernment interference.42 They did not seek recognition of a positive 
right to a minimal level of shelter or to any particular policy to address 
the problem of homelessness. More critical rights to shelter – rights 
well-established under international law as binding on Canada as a 
nation – were raised before the Court of Appeal by the intervenor Poverty 
and Human Rights Centre.43 Of course, one cannot fault either the 
claimants or their lawyers for arguing what is most likely to succeed in 
court, but it can be an unfortunate tactic from the perspective of long-
term Charter development. And that this seems to be how a winning 
argument in this case must be crafted speaks broadly of the distressing 
state of constitutional rights jurisprudence. It also illustrates the problem 
of individual case representation of key socio-economic issues and makes 
all the more cogent the need for strategic, systemically informed social 
and economic Charter rights claims by public interest third parties.44 
 This case thus leads us to revisit the politics of rights protection 
under our Charter. The time to argue against a constitutional bill of 
rights is long past: that question was decided in 1982. But assessment 
of what the Charter has and can mean for social justice in Canada is 
surely as important as ever. To what extent can the rights under our 
Charter “partake in political and social transformation in a way that 
does not merely affirm the status quo and reduce transformation to 
mere repetition and reproduction of the past and the present”?45 If the 
right that results from this case is the best that the Charter can offer in 
the face of such real and material social injustice as homelessness, then 
constitutionalized rights are cold and thin comfort indeed for the many 
individuals sleeping on our streets and in our parks.
 The challenge is political and not simply doctrinal or legal, and the 
stakes in the struggle for social and economic rights are high: “the 
reason that ‘rights talk’ is resisted by the powerful is precisely because 
it threatens (or promises) to rectify distributions of political, economic 
or social power that, under internationally agreed standards and values, 
are unjust.”46 Social and economic rights, more than the rights more 
 42 Adams (Factum of the Respondents, Opening Statement).
 43 Adams (Factum of the Intervenor, Poverty and Human Rights Centre, para. 13).
 44 Unfortunately, these cases too often raise standing and procedural issues that bar their 
carriage by public interest third parties. See, for example, Canadian Bar Association v. hmtq 
et al., 2006 bscs 1342, [2007] 1 W.W.R. 331. See also Canadian Bar Assn. v. British Columbia, 
2008 bcca 92, 290 D.L.R. (4th) 617.
 45 Karin Van Marie, “Haunting (In)Equalities,” in Rethinking Equality Projects in Law: Feminist 
Challenges, ed. Rosemary Hunter, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008), 125.
 46 Arbour, “Freedom from Want.”
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traditional to liberal societies, call for disruption of current balances of 
power and resources. For this reason they are resisted by governments 
and difficult for courts. 
 Ultimately, the tougher and real question is why anyone in Canada 
should end up sleeping in a park – even with the shelter of a tarp or 
cardboard box. Governments have failed to respond adequately to this 
challenge. No wonder that the dispossessed and politically powerless 
have looked to the Charter and the rights it enshrines for just resolution. 
Whether or not our Charter and our Canadian courts are up to this task 
is still an open question.
Postscript
The Court of Appeal decision was released in December 2009. The 
bench of three justices unanimously upheld the Supreme Court decision, 
allowing the appeal only to the extent of making the declaration of 
unconstitutionality of the bylaws more specific. The Court of Appeal 
resisted arguments that the respondents were seeking positive benefits 
under section 7 and agreed with the trial judge that it was not necessary 
in this case to decide whether section 7 protects positive rights. The 
City of Victoria has said it will not appeal the decision to the Supreme 
Court of Canada.
